This paper documents that new loans to large borrowers fell by 37% during the peak period of the financial crisis (September-November 2008) relative to the prior three-month period and by 68% relative to the peak of the credit boom (Mar-May 2007). New lending for real investment (such as capital expenditures) fell to the same extent as new lending for restructuring (LBOs, M&A, share repurchases). Banks that have access to deposit financing cut their lending less than banks with less access to deposit financing. In addition, there is a large overhang of revolving credit facilities, which may also have curtailed lending. We document an increase in drawdowns of revolving credit facilities. Many of these drawdowns were undertaken by low credit quality firms concerned about their access to funding. While helpful to these borrowers, they may limit the ability of banks to make other loans. Banks with more revolving lines outstanding relative to deposits reduced their lending more than those with less revolving line exposure.
Introduction
The global financial crisis that erupted in September, 2008 has thrown economies around the world into recession. The seeds of this crisis were sown in the credit boom that peaked in mid-2007, followed by the meltdown of sub-prime mortgages and securitized products. The resulting concerns about the health of financial institutions became a full-blown banking panic following the failures of Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual, and government takeovers of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG. Although the panic subsided in the first half of October after a variety of government actions to promote the liquidity and solvency of the financial sector, prices across most asset classes and commodities fell drastically, the cost of corporate and bank borrowing rose substantially, and financial market volatility rose to levels that have rarely, if ever, been seen.
The goal of this paper is to understand a key mechanism through which financial crises can affect the real economy, namely the supply of credit to the corporate sector. Towards this end, we examine data on loan syndications, which is the primary source of loans for large corporations. In these syndications a lead bank "originates" a loan and lines up other financial institutions to buy a portion of the loan. This market has evolved over the last twenty years as the main vehicle through which banks and other financial institutions lend to large corporations.
We start by documenting that syndicated lending started falling in mid-2007 and that it accelerated with the onset of the financial crisis in September 2008. During the SeptemberNovember 2008 period, lending was 37% lower than the prior three-month period and it was 68% lower than the three-month period at the peak of the credit boom, March-May 2007.
Lending fell across all types of loans -those used to finance buyouts and takeovers as well as those for real investment. New revolving credit facilities and new term loans also fell. The decline in lending was particularly steep for below-investment-grade loans.
Our finding of a decline in lending is ostensibly at odds with Chari, Chistiano and Kehoe (2008) who document that commercial and industrial (C&I) loans reported on the balance sheet of U.S. banks rose by about $100 billion from September to mid-October, 2008. However, their finding can be reconciled with ours if the rise in C&I loans on bank balance sheets reflects an increase in drawdowns of existing revolving credit facilities. Indeed, we document that this was likely the case. From news accounts alone, we are able to document $16 billion of credit line drawdowns (Table II) , which would account for approximately 15.5% of the increase in C&I loans reported on bank balance sheets. In almost all instances, the firms state that they are drawing on their credit lines because of concerns about the financial markets. Thus, these drawdowns are likely to be crisis-related, not drawdowns for usual business purposes. Given our estimate of roughly $3,500 billion in outstanding revolving credit lines, the drawdowns were likely much larger than what we find in news reports.
A reduction in lending does not, by itself, show that there was a decline in the supply of credit. It is possible that the recession and general economic uncertainty reduced the demand for credit by corporate borrowers. To separate supply and demand effects, we relate bank lending to a bank's willingness or ability to lend during the crisis. In particular, we focus on the role of deposits and revolving credit lines in mitigating and exacerbating the effects of the turmoil in financial markets.
We argue that banks that have a strong base of deposits will likely cut their lending less during the crisis. Concerns about bank solvency made it difficult for banks to roll over shortterm debt and raise additional long-term debt. Commercial paper issuance by financial institutions fell dramatically, and commercial paper that was issued was very short term. Thus, banks with a large and stable base of deposits (particularly if they are insured) should be less dependent on financing from short-term debt markets, and therefore less credit-constrained. In addition, as concerns about general credit quality rose during the crisis, investors pulled their money from uninsured money market funds and the commercial paper market, and redeployed their funds to banks in the form of insured deposits. Therefore, banks that were in a better position to attract deposits, were likely less credit-constrained and thus in a better position to lend than banks without a strong deposit base.
Although a strong deposit base could help a bank to continue lending, Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) show that banks that finance more with deposits also extend more credit lines.
When credit markets freeze and it is difficult to raise capital, firms tap their unused credit lines.
If banks are themselves credit-constrained, then drawdowns of existing lines limit the ability of banks to make new loans. Gatev and Strahan (2006) argue, however, that when there are systemic shocks that lead firms to draw on their credit facilities, those same shocks may also lead to an increase in bank deposits. Specifically, if there is concern about credit quality in commercial paper markets, as occurred after the Enron collapse, firms will tap their backup commercial paper lines. At the same time, investors will withdraw from money market funds that invest in commercial paper, and instead place their money in insured deposits. Thus, banks with deposits are in a better position to withstand the effects of credit line drawdowns. These observations suggest that banks that have more credit line exposure relative to deposits may be in a worse position to continue lending during the financial crisis.
We explore these factors by estimating the cross-sectional determinants of the change in bank lending during the financial crisis. We first establish that banks with more deposit financing (scaled by assets) had a smaller percentage reduction in lending. The median bank cuts its lending by 39% in August-November 2008, relative to the prior year, August 2007-July 2008. However, a bank with deposits one standard deviation below the mean cuts lending by 51%, while a bank with deposits one standard deviation above the mean cuts lending by only 14%.
Similarly, we look at exposure to revolving lines net of deposits (both scaled by bank assets). This variable, which we call net revolving line exposure, is negatively related to loan growth; banks with more credit line exposure cut lending more during the financial crisis. This regression has somewhat more explanatory power than the regression with deposits. A bank with net revolving line exposure one standard deviation above the mean cuts lending by 47%, while a bank with net exposure one standard deviation below the mean cuts lending by only 10%. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the data. Section 3 presents the basic facts about aggregate bank lending for a variety of loan types, and it documents the importance of credit line drawdowns. Section 4 presents the cross-sectional regressions and Section 5 concludes.
Data
The data for our analysis come from Reuters' DealScan database of large bank loans.
Almost all these loans are syndicated, i.e., originated by one or more banks and sold to a syndicate of banks and other investors, notably to those structuring collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), as well as insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds. Although CDOs were a large buyer of loans, by the fourth quarter of 2007, they effectively disappeared as buyers after the meltdown in securitized mortgages.
The mean size of the loans in 2008 was $425 million, the median was $125 million, and 90% were larger than $21 million. The average borrower had sales of $5.9 billion. While we do not have data on small loans, the loans in our sample account for a large share of outstanding bank loans. In fact, the value of the outstanding loans in our sample exceeds the value of C&I loans on commercial bank balance sheets. 
Basic Facts
Panel A of Figure decline in revolving credit facilities with a maturity greater than one year was even larger. These facilities, which comprise a large portion of originations, require banks to allocate more regulatory capital than do facilities with a maturity of less than one year. Thus, it is not surprising that there has been a bigger drop in the longer term facilities.
[FIGURE 4]
As noted above, it is important to reconcile our findings with those of Chari et. al. (2008) , who have documented that C&I loans on bank balance sheets were trending slightly upward for much of 2008, until they rose substantially in following the collapse of Lehman Brothers before stabilizing in the middle of October 2008. Figure 5 shows this graphically.
To reconcile our findings with theirs, it is useful to note the following identity:
OutstandingLoans t = OutstandingLoans t-1 + NewLoans t + Drawdowns t -LoanRetirements t
Thus, outstanding loans will increase more if there are more new loans, more drawdowns, or fewer loan retirements. Since new loans appear to be decreasing, this means that there are either more draw-downs or fewer loan retirements.
[FIGURE 5]
Loan Retirements. Firms may choose to retire debt early with excess cash flow or a stock issue. In fact, in many LBOs, there are explicit plans to pay down debt early with excess cash flow. Though we have no direct evidence of a reduction in loan retirements, it would not be surprising if firms increasingly chose not to repay debt early. This would be the case for LBOs that are running into trouble, firms that want the security of having more cash on their balance sheets, or those that are reluctant to repay debt by issuing equity in a down market.. There were no equivalent announcements in the prior three-month period, which suggests that there has been an increase in drawdowns. The drawdowns total $16 billion. Sixteen of the 22 rated companies are currently below investment grade. At the time of the drawdowns, the average credit default swap spread for the eight companies for which data were available was over 1,500 basis points. Nevertheless, twelve of the sixteen firms were able to draw down and pay interest rates that were below current rates for non-investment-grade debt (LIBOR + 275 basis points). Although violation of the financial covenants could prevent companies from drawing down the lines, most of the loans originated in the past two years were "covenant-lite;" they had loose covenants, which would not prevent them from drawing down their credit lines as their financial condition worsened.
[TABLE II]
The reasons given for the drawdowns are also instructive. In forteen cases, firms state that they are drawing down to enhance liquidity and financial flexibility during the credit crisis.
For example, in an 8-K filing with the SEC, the Tribune Company notes that it "is borrowing under the revolving credit facility to increase its cash position to preserve its financial flexibility in light of the current uncertainty in the credit markets." While Tribune's recent bankruptcy filing and the credit problems of the other firms list in Table II make clear that financial market turmoil was not the only reason for an increase in drawdowns, it is likely that that a combination of firm-specific credit problems and market-wide financial turmoil led to an acceleration of drawdowns.
While C&I loans on bank balance sheets rose from September to mid-October, Figure 5 shows that they leveled off just after October 14, 2008 when the Treasury bought equity in nine large banks and the FDIC offered to guarantee new issues of bank debt. Veronesi and Zingales (2008) have documented that this led to a large drop in the perceived probability of default as measured by bank credit default swap spreads. Thus, as concerns about bank solvency diminished, firms slowed their drawdowns of revolving lines.
Figure 5 also shows that as C&I loans rose so did deposits until they started declining in mid-October. Funds that would otherwise have been invested in commercial paper and money market funds moved over to insured deposits with concerns about credit quality in those markets.
They moved back to commercial paper and money market funds after a variety of interventions in those markets. These patterns lend support to our claim that banks with greater access to insured deposits would have had less financing trouble and would have been in a better position to lend.
Determinants of Bank Lending During the Crisis
We now examine the characteristics of banks that affected their lending behavior during the crisis. We start by examining the role of deposits. We argue that deposits, particularly insured deposits, are a more stable source of capital than short-term debt. With concerns about bank solvency, interbank lending dried up and banks found it difficult to roll over short-term debt. As discussed by Diamond and Rajan (2001) , this is a common feature of financial crises.
by less in the financial crisis.
To examine this prediction, we start by calculating total deposits as a fraction of assets measured as of December 2007. Ideally, we would also use insured deposits; however, we were not able to get these data for the several foreign banks in our sample (e.g., Royal Bank of Scotland, Societe Generale). As Table III 
[TABLE III]
The empirical analysis looks at the percentage change in bank lending during the August -November 2008 period relative to a base period before the crisis. We use two base periods.
One base period is August 2007-July 2008, the year before the August-November 2008. As shown in the prior section, this base period was a credit crisis of its own, with a big decline in bank lending. We call this base period Crisis I, and the later period Crisis II. We also compare Crisis II to the period August 2006-July 2007, which was a period of robust loan growth. We refer to this period at Pre-Crisis.
As can be seen from Table III , in Crisis II the median bank cuts lending drastically. For example, in Crisis II, there is a 39% decrease in the number of monthly loan syndications in which the median bank participates relative to Crisis I; there is a 55% decrease relative to Pre-relative to Pre-Crisis.
The question we take up now is whether these reductions are related to deposits. Table   IV reports the results of regressing percentage change in loan growth on deposits (normalized by assets). In odd columns we calculate the change in loans relative to Crisis I as the base period and in even columns the base period is Pre-Crisis. In Panel A we measure loans in three different ways: the total number of loans in which the bank participates either as a lead bank or syndicate member (columns 1 and 2); the total number of loans in which the bank acts as the lead bank (columns 3 and 4); the dollar amount of loans in which in which the bank acts as the lead bank (columns 5 and 6) Note that we do not observe the actual amount of a loan, only the amount lent by the syndicate and whether a bank is a lead lender or other syndicate member.
[TABLE IV]
Regardless of how we define the change in loans, the coefficient on deposits is positive, and statistically significant in most of the specifications. For example, in column 3 of Table IV, Panel A, the dependent variable is the percentage change from Crisis I to Crisis II in the number of loans in which the bank plays the lead role. The average bank experiences a 32% drop in the number of lead syndications; however, the estimated coefficients imply that banks with deposits one standard deviation above the mean experience a 14% drop, while banks one standard deviation below the mean experience a 51% drop in dollar lending volume.
Banks with low deposits experience the biggest declines in lending. It is possible, however, that these banks, many of which are investment banks or finance companies, specialize in loan types that experience an especially sharp drop in demand. In particular, there was a big drop in LBO and M&A activity during Crisis I and Crisis II. If investment banks made more of these loans before the crisis (perhaps to support their private equity and M&A advisory businesses), it could generate the pattern we observe. Panel B addresses this concern by focusing on real investment loans -those intended to be used for "corporate purposes" or working capital. Here too we observe the same basic pattern of results, with positive and often statistically significant coefficients on deposits.
Another concern might be that less deposit-dependent banks, particularly investment banks, experienced a greater increase in lending during the credit boom. It would therefore not be surprising if they experienced a steeper fall. We performed three tests to rule out this possibility. First, we documented that less deposit-dependent banks did not increase their lending more during the credit boom. Second, we excluded investment banks from the sample, with no effect on the results. Third, we included the growth in loans during the credit boom as a control in our regression analysis. This control did not affect the estimated coefficient of deposits on loan growth.
The analysis uses total deposits as our main explanatory variable. Since insured deposits are an even more stable supply of capital, it would be useful to verify that the same relationship holds with this variable. Unfortunately, we do not have reliable information on insured deposits from many of the foreign banks in the sample. Nevertheless, for those we do have, we have found that there is a positive relationship between loan growth and insured deposits.
As a final test we examined the effect of deposits on loan growth in a panel data set where a bank's month lending is the unit of observation. We find the same basic pattern of results using that approach. However, since our main interest is in how different types of banks respond to the crisis, the panel structure does not add much and risks understating standard errors. Thus, we reported only the cross-sectional results, with its conservatively estimated standard errors.
We now move to our analysis of the effect of potential drawdowns of outstanding revolving credit facilities on lending behavior of banks. As noted in the introduction and as demonstrated in Table II , firms have been drawing on their credit lines both because of their own financial troubles and because of concerns about the ability of banks fund these commitments.
One way to examine this effect would be to estimate the relationship between loan growth and the existing stock of outstanding revolving lines. The problem with this approach is that revolving lines and deposits are highly positively correlated as theory suggests (Kashyap, Rajan and Stein, 2002 and Gatev and Strahan, 2006) . Thus, estimating an independent effect with few observations is difficult, if not impossible.
Instead, we calculate a variable that measures the mismatch between revolving lines and deposits, i.e. the stock of outstanding revolving lines less deposits normalized by bank assets.
We will refer to this variable as net revolving line exposure. Gatev and Strahan (2006) show that deposits tend to rise when there are abnormally high credit lines drawdowns. These drawdowns are likely to occur when credit risk associated with commercial paper is perceived to be high.
But at those times, would-be commercial paper investors will move their funds to insured deposits. We saw a similar phenomenon between September 2008 and mid-October 2008, as shown in Figure 5 . Thus, banks with large revolver exposure but few deposits will not see an offsetting increase in deposits as credit lines are drawn down. This drains the bank of liquidity, and leads it to lend less. By contrast, a bank that has limited revolver exposure and a large deposit base does not face the prospect of drawdowns and has a stable funding base. Such a bank should be in a better position to make new loans during the financial crisis. Table V shows that, in general, the net revolving line exposure is negatively related to the percent change in loans, measured in the same way as Table IV . Banks with greater net exposure, lend less. For example, the estimated coefficients reported in a column 3, which estimates the effect on the change in the number of lead syndications, predicts that a bank with net revolving line exposure one standard deviation above the mean cuts lending by 47%, while a bank one standard deviation below the mean cuts lending by only 10%.
[TABLE V]
Of course, one has to be careful interpreting our results since our measure subtracts out deposits, which is positively related to lending. Thus, it is not surprising that our net exposure measure has an estimated negative effect. However, it is worth noting that in most specifications the net revolving line exposure measure has a higher R 2 than the comparable regressions with deposits as the dependent variable. These findings should be interpreted as suggestive of an effect of revolving lines, but they are admittedly not conclusive.
Conclusion
New lending declined substantially during the financial crisis across all types of loans.
Some of this decline could reflect a drop in demand as firms scale back expansion plans during a recession. However, we show that there may be a supply effect as well: banks with less access to deposit financing and more revolving line exposure reduced their lending more than other banks. While this is consistent with the existence of a supply effect at the bank level, it is possible that there was a shifted in lending from one set of banks to another without affecting the aggregate supply of credit. If, however, bank-borrower relationships matter for the lending process, then borrowers may not be able to easily switch from one lender to another. Ultimately, to determine the real effects of the financial crisis, researchers will need to examine the investment and performance of potential borrowers, not just lenders. (Lead bank) indicates variables calculated using only loans where the bank is the lead arranger; based on pro-rata credit and estimated retained share of the loans. All the other variables just count the total number of loans with the bank participation. Real investment loans are defined as those that are intended for general corporate purposes, capital expenditure or working capital. To account for reporting bias, all loan numbers correspond to pro-rated figures. Estimates excluding outliers are reported in italics. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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